In this article, we address the problem of safety verification of nonlinear hybrid systems. A hybrid symbolicnumeric method is presented to compute exact inequality invariants of hybrid systems efficiently. Some numerical invariants of a hybrid system can be obtained by solving a bilinear SOS programming via the PENBMI solver or iterative method, then the modified Newton refinement and rational vector recovery techniques are applied to obtain exact polynomial invariants with rational coefficients, which exactly satisfy the conditions of invariants. Experiments on some benchmarks are given to illustrate the efficiency of our algorithm.
INTRODUCTION
Complex physical systems are systems in which the techniques of sensing, control, communication, and coordination are involved and interacted with each other. Since many of such systems are safety critical systems, such as the controllers widely used in airplanes, railway, and automobiles, ensuring correct functioning of these systems is among the most important and challenging problems in computer science, mathematics, and engineering. As a common mathematical model for complex physical systems, hybrid systems [Henzinger 1996 ] are dynamical systems that are governed by interacting discrete and continuous dynamics. Continuous dynamics is specified by differential equations, and for discrete transitions, the hybrid system changes state Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies show this notice on the first page or initial screen of a display along with the full citation. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers, to redistribute to lists, or to use any component of this work in other works requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Permissions may be requested from Publications Dept., ACM, Inc., 2 Penn Plaza, Suite 701, New York, NY 10121-0701 USA, fax +1 (212) 869-0481, or permissions@acm.org. c 2015 ACM 1539-9087/2015/01-ART16 $15.00 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2629424 instantaneously and possibly discontinuously. Among the most important research issues on hybrid systems are those of safety (i.e., deciding whether a given property holds in all the reachable states) and its dual problem reachability [Alur et al. 2006 ] (i.e., deciding if there exists a trajectory starting from the initial set that reaches a state satisfying the given property).
Because of the infinite number of possible states in continuous state spaces, safety verification or reachability analysis of hybrid systems presents a challenge. Some well-established techniques have been proposed. In Chutinan and Krogh [2003] , level set methods and flow-pipe approximations were presented for computing approximate reachable sets of hybrid systems. By contrast, quantifier elimination was used in Lafferriere et al. [2001] to compute exact reachable sets for linear systems with certain eigenstructures and semialgebraic initial sets, and this method was generalized by Tiwari [2003] to handle linear systems with almost arbitrary eigenstructures. Recently, invariant generation has been proposed for safety verification of hybrid systems. An invariant [Sankaranarayanan et al. 2008 ] of a hybrid system is a property that holds in all the reachable states of the system; in other words, it is an over-approximation of all the reachable states. Invariants are useful facts about the dynamics of a given system. However, generating invariants of arbitrary form is known to be computationally hard, intractable even for the simplest classes. The usual technique for generating invariants is to compute an inductive invariant, an assertion that holds initially, and is preserved by all discrete and continuous state changes. There has been a lot of work toward invariant generation for hybrid systems using convex optimization and semialgebraic system solving [Rodríguez-Carbonell and Tiwari 2005; Gulwani and Tiwari 2008; Liu et al. 2011; Platzer and Clarke 2009; Sankaranarayanan et al. 2008; Prajna 2005; Tiwari 2003; Sturm and Tiwari 2011] . However, some of these techniques are subject to numerical errors and some suffer from high complexity. Taking advantage of the efficiency of numerical computation and the error-free property of symbolic computation, we proposed in Wu and Yang [2011] a hybrid symbolic-numeric method via sum of squares (SOS) relaxation and exact certificate to construct differential invariants for continuous dynamic systems, and generalized in Lin et al. [2014] the idea for safety verification of hybrid systems.
In this article, we present a hybrid symbolic-numeric algorithm to compute exact invariants of hybrid systems. The algorithm is based on SOS relaxation [Parrilo 2003 ] of a parametric polynomial optimization problem with bilinear matrix inequality (BMI) constraints, which can be solved directly using a recently developed PENBMI solver [Kočvara and Stingl 2003; Kočvara and Stingl 2005] in Matlab or an iterative method, and exact SOS representation recovery techniques presented in [Kaltofen et al. 2008 [Kaltofen et al. , 2012 . The algorithm in this work improves our former result in [Lin et al. 2014] in two aspects. First, we replace the strengthened linear matrix inequality (LMI) constraints with the original BMI constraints in the parametric optimization problem. Second, we modify both Newton iteration refinement and rational vector recovery, which can handle some cases where the method in Lin et al. [2014] fails and usually yield invariants with lower degree. Unlike the numerical approaches, our method can yield exact invariants, which can overcome the unsoundness in verification of hybrid systems caused by numerical errors [Platzer and Clarke 2007] , as illustrated in Example 5.1. In comparison with some symbolic approaches based on qualifier elimination technique, our approach is more efficient and practical because the parametric polynomial optimization problem based on SOS relaxation can be solved in polynomial time theoretically.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce some notions about hybrid systems and safety verification. In Section 3, we transform the problem of safety verification of hybrid systems into a parametric program with BMI constraints. Section 4 is devoted to computing numerical solutions of a BMI problem via PENBMI solver or iterative method. In Section 5, an algorithm based on the modified Newton iteration and rational vector recovery techniques is proposed to obtain exact solutions of BMI problem with rational coefficients. In Section 6, we discuss issues related to the implementation of the proposed method. In Section 7, experiments on some benchmarks are shown to illustrate our algorithm on safety verification. Section 8 concludes the article.
HYBRID SYSTEMS AND SAFETY VERIFICATION
To model hybrid systems, we use the notion of hybrid automata [Henzinger 1996; Sankaranarayanan et al. 2008] .
Definition 2.1 (Hybrid system). A hybrid system H : V, L, T , , D, , 0 consists of the following components: -V = {x 1 ,..., x n }, a set of real-valued system variables. A state is an interpretation of V , assigning to each x i ∈ V a real value. An assertion is a first-order formula over V . A state s satisfies an assertion ϕ, written as s |= ϕ, if ϕ holds on the state s. We will also write ϕ 1 |= ϕ 2 for two assertions ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 to denote that ϕ 2 is true at least in all the states in which ϕ 1 is true; -L, a finite set of locations; -T , a set of (discrete) transitions. Each transition τ : , , g τ , ρ τ ∈ T consists of a prelocation ∈ L, a postlocation ∈ L, the guard condition g τ over V , and an assertion ρ τ over V ∪ V representing the next-state relation, where V = {x 1 , . . . , x n } denotes the next-state variables. Note that the transition τ can take place only if g τ holds; -, an assertion specifying the initial condition; -D, a map that associates each location ∈ L to a differential rule (also known as a vector field) D( ), an autonomous systemẋ i = f ,i (V ) for each x i ∈ V , written briefly asẋ = f (x). The differential rule at a location specifies how the system variables evolve in that location; -, a map that maps each location ∈ L to a location condition (location invariant) ( ), an assertion over V ; -0 ∈ L, the initial location. We assume that the initial condition satisfies the location invariant at the initial location, that is, |= ( 0 ).
where n is the number of program variables in H. A trajectory of H is an infinite sequence of states 
A state , x is called a reachable state of a hybrid system H from the initial state set 0 × if it appears in some trajectory of H. During a continuous flow, the discrete location i is maintained and the continuous state variables x evolve according to the differential equationsẋ = f i (x), with x satisfying the location invariant ( i ). At the state i , x , if the guard condition g( i , j ) is met, the system may undergo a transition to location j , and x will take the new value x , which is determined by the reset map ρ( i , j ).
Given a hybrid system H with a prespecified unsafe region X u ⊂ R n , we say that the system H is safe if all trajectories of H starting from any state in the initial set, can not evolve to X u , or, equivalently, any state in X u is not reachable. We can also specify an unsafe region, denoted as X u ( ), for each location ∈ L.
For safety verification of hybrid systems, the notion of invariants of hybrid systems plays an important role.
Definition 2.2 (Invariant). [Sankaranarayanan et al. 2008 ] An invariant of a hybrid system at location is an assertion I such that for any reachable state , x of the hybrid system, x |= I.
An invariant of a hybrid system is an assertion that holds in all the reachable states of the system.
Clearly, an invariant of a hybrid system is an over-approximation of all the reachable states of the system. If an invariant lies inside the safe regions, or its intersection with the unsafe regions is empty, then safety of hybrid systems is verified. However, generating invariants with arbitrary form is known to be computationally hard-intractable even for the simplest classes. The usual technique for generating invariants is to compute inductive invariants, as defined in the following [Lin et al. 2014] . 
By a polynomial hybrid system, we mean a hybrid system H : V, L, T , , D, , 0 , where the initial condition , location invariants ( ), and the guard condition and reset relation in each transition τ ∈ T are conjunctions of polynomial inequalities over the program variables, and moreover, each differential rule D( ) is of the forṁ
In a preceding paper [Lin et al. 2014 ], we proposed a symbolic-numeric approach to generate polynomial invariants of the form ϕ(x) ≥ 0 for polynomial hybrid systems via the combination of SOS relaxation with Gauss-Newton refinement and rational vector recovery techniques. We will describe how to improve our result in Lin et al. [2014] by solving the BMI problem directly. As stated in the following theorem, safety verification of hybrid systems can be reduced to finding invariants of hybrid systems. 
then the safety of the system H is guaranteed.
PROOF. The proof is obvious.
As stated in Theorem 2.4, the existence of the invariants ϕ l (x) provides an exact certificate of safety of the hybrid system H. Therefore, Theorem 2.4 supplies a sufficient condition for safety of the hybrid systems.
Example 2.5. Figure 1 is a graphical representation of a hybrid system consisting of a thermostat and the heating of a room. The temperature x is controlled by switching a heater on and off. It is easy to verify the assertion 68 < x < 82 is an invariant of this system. Clearly, to guarantee safety of the hybrid system H, the intersection of the initial set and the unsafe region X u ( 0 ) must be empty. When the hybrid system H in Theorem 2.4 specializes to a continuous system at one location, denoted as D : V, , D, , then condition (iv) in Theorem 2.4 can be relaxed through replacing the whole unsafe region X u by its boundary ∂ X u , as illustrated by the following.
be a continuous system. Suppose there exists a function ϕ(x) satisfying the following conditions: 
PROOF. By conditions (i) and (ii)
, the values of ϕ(x) cannot be negative during the entire evolution of the system D. Then condition (iii) implies that all reachable sets lie outside the unsafe region X u , yielding the safety of the system.
In addition, we can consider more complicated forms of invariants for safety verification, that is, invariants that are conjunctions of several polynomial inequalities:
i ϕ ,i (x) ≥ 0. For simplicity, we consider the invariants of H of the form:
The following theorem provides a method to determine the invariants of the aforementioned form. 
PROOF. It is easy to prove that Conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) imply that
Similarly, the following corollary shows that the invariant in Theorem 2.7 can guarantee the safety of hybrid systems. COROLLARY 2.8. Let H : V, L, T , , D, , 0 be a hybrid system, and X u ( ) = {x ∈ R n : ζ (x) ≥ 0} denotes the unsafe region at location . Suppose for each location ∈ L, there exist two functions ϕ ,1 (x), ϕ ,2 (x) that satisfy the conditions (i-iii) in Theorem 2.7, and moreover,
Remark 2.9. ϕ ,1 (x) ≥ 0 ∧ ϕ ,2 (x) ≥ 0 in Theorem 2.7 is an invariant of the hybrid system H at location , but it is not ensured that either ϕ ,1 (x) ≥ 0 or ϕ ,2 (x) ≥ 0 is an invariant of H at the location . Furthermore, it is easy to see that an invariant of the form
PROBLEM REFORMULATION
For brevity, we will use the notation ϕ (x) to represent both the function ϕ (x) and the invariant ϕ (x) ≥ 0. In the sequel, we will discuss how to find invariants ϕ (x) for each location ∈ L. Remark that the invariants ϕ (x) or ϕ(x) are also known as barrier certificates in Prajna [2005] .
Let us predetermine a template of polynomial invariants with the given degree d. We assume that ϕ (x) = α c α x α , where
, and c α ∈ R are parameters. We can rewrite ϕ (x) = c T · T (x), where T (x) is the (column) vector of all terms in x 1 , . . . , x n with total degree ≤ d, and c ∈ R ν , with ν = ( n+d n ), is the coefficient vector of ϕ (x). In the sequel, we write ϕ (x) as ϕ (x, c ) for clarity.
From Theorem 2.4, to verify the safety of hybrid system H, we need to find the invariants ϕ (x) at each location ∈ L. The latter problem can be translated into the following problem
holds. Therefore, the existence of SOS representations provides a sufficient and necessary condition of the strict positiveness of g(x) on the set {x ∈ R n : m i=1 f i (x) ≥ 0}. Moreover, the degree bound of those unknown SOS polynomials σ i is exponential in n, deg(g) and deg( f i ). For more details, the reader can refer to Lasserre [2010] . Based on the previous observation, Problem (1) can be transformed into an equivalent SOS programming of the form
where
, and ,1 , ,2 ∈ R + . In practice, to avoid the high computational complexity, we simply set up a truncated SOS programming by fixing a priori (much smaller) degree bound 2e, with e ∈ Z + , of all the unknown polynomials. Consequently, the existence of a solution c of () can guarantee the safety property of the given system.
In the SOS programming (2), the decision variables are the coefficients of all the unknown polynomials in (2), such as ϕ (x, c ), σ l (x),λ ,i (x). Note that since the coefficients of ϕ (x, c ), η (x) and ν (x) are unknown, some nonlinear terms that are products of these coefficients, will occur in the second and third constraints of (2), which yields a nonconvex BMI problem. In Lin et al. [2014] , to avoid this BMI problem we strengthened the second and third constraints in (1) to
respectively, which then results in an LMI problem. For more details, please refer to Theorems 5 and 6 in Lin et al. [2014] . In this article, we will discuss in Section 4 how to handle the SOS programming (2) directly using the BMI solver or iterative method.
Clearly, when the functions ϕ (x) at all locations are identical to ϕ(x), then ϕ(x) becomes an inductive invariant of the hybrid system. Similar with ϕ l (x), we set the polynomial template of ϕ(x), and construct the associated parametric polynomial optimization problem (1) to compute ϕ(x). In doing so, the number of the decision variables is smaller, but the results may be more conservative.
APPROXIMATE SOLUTION FROM BMI SOLVER
In Section 3, we have reduced the problem of safety verification of a hybrid system to the SOS programming (2) involving BMI constraints.
Let us first show by an example on how to transform nonlinear parametric polynomial constraints into a BMI problem.
Example 4.1. Consider the systemẋ = 2x with location invariant = {x ∈ R : x 2 − 1 ≤ 0}. From the discussion in Section 3, to find a polynomial ϕ(x) satisfying ϕ(x) ≥ 0 ∧ |=φ(x) ≥ 0, we need to find ϕ(x) such thaṫ
where φ 0 (x), φ 1 (x), φ 2 (x) are SOSes. Suppose that deg(ϕ) = 1, deg(φ 0 ) = 2 and deg(φ 1 ) = deg(φ 2 ) = 0, and that ϕ(x) = u 0 + u 1 x, φ 1 = u 2 , and φ 2 = v 1 , with u 0 , u 1 , u 2 , v 1 ∈ R parameters. From (3), we have
whose square matrix representation (SMR) [Chesi 2010 ] is φ 0 (x) = Z T QZ, where
Because all the φ i (x) are SOSes, we have u 2 ≥ 0, v 1 ≥ 0 and Q 0, which can be expressed as one parametric positive semidefinite matrix
Therefore, the constraint (3) is translated into a BMI constraint
where A i , B j,1 are constant symmetric matrices.
Similar to Example 4.1, the SOS programming (2) can be transformed into a BMI problem of the form
where A i , B ij are constant symmetric matrices, u = (u 1 , . . . , u m ), v = (v 1 , . . . , v k ) are parameter coefficients of the SOSes occurring in the original SOS problem, and the objective function F(u, v) is a dummy objective function, which is commonly used for optimization problem with no objective functions.
Many methods can be used to solve the BMI problem (4) directly, such as interiorpoint constrained trust region method [Leibfritz and Mostafa 2002] , an augmented Lagrangian strategy [Kočvara and Stingl 2003] , and so on. A Matlab package PENBMI solver [Kočvara and Stingl 2005] , which combines the (exterior) penalty and (interior) barrier method with the augmented Lagrangian method, can be applied directly on the BMI program (4). This can yield efficiently numerical solutions to the SOS programming (2).
Alternatively, observing in (4), B(u, v) involves no crossing products like u i u j and v i v j . Taking this special form into account, an iterative method can be applied by fixing u and v alternatively, which leads to a convex LMI problem [Prajna 2005; Shah et al. 2008] . The following is an algorithm.
Algorithm 1. BMI Solver based on Iteration
(1) [Initialization] Set u = u 0 . Then (4) becomes to an LMI problem
Suppose we obtain a feasible solutionv by solving the above LMI problem. 
Repeat steps 2 and 3 until a feasible solution (ū,v) is found such that B(ū,v) 0. Remark that Algorithm 1 is a general form of the iterative method suggested in [Prajna 2005; Shah et al. 2008] . Although the convergence of Algorithm 1 cannot be guaranteed, the iterative method is easier to implement than PENBMI solver. Moreover, from the experiments shown in Section 7, Algorithm 1 can yield a feasible solution (ū,v) efficiently in practice.
EXACT SOS RECOVERY
Because the LMI or BMI solvers in Matlab are running in fixed precision, the techniques in Section 4 only yield numerical solutions of (1). Due to round-off errors, ϕ (x, c ) may not be an invariant of the given hybrid system at location , because the constraints in (1) may not hold exactly, as illustrated by the following example.
Example 5.1 [Prajna 2005, page 31] . Consider the following nonlinear system: We want to verify that all trajectories of the system starting from the initial set will never enter the unsafe region X u , where
We need to find an invariant ϕ(x 1 , x 2 ) with rational coefficients, which satisfies all the conditions in (1). As stated in Lin et al. [2014] , we first set up a semidefinite programming (SDP) system using LMI constraints. Apply the SDP solver to find a numerical polynomial invariant ) such that the third constraint of (1) cannot be satisfied. Therefore,φ(x 1 , x 2 ) is not an exact invariant of this system. Case 2. In our former papers [Wu and Yang 2011; Lin et al. 2014 ], we applied GaussNewton iteration and rational vector recovery to obtain solutions that satisfy the constraints in (1). This technique may fail in some cases. Let τ = 10 −2 and the bound of the common denominator of the rational polynomial be 100. Then we obtain a rational polynomialφ However, the subsequent Gauss-Newton iteration and rational vector recovery techniques in Wu and Yang [2011] and Lin et al. [2014] failed in finding the associated positive semidefinite matrices that satisfy the constraints of the polynomial invariant exactly. The reason may lies in that we recover the coefficient vector of ϕ(x 1 , x 2 ) and the associated positive semidefinite matrices separately.
In the sequel, we will propose an improved algorithm to compute exact solutions of polynomial optimization problems with BMI constraints, through a modified Newton refinement and rational vector recovery technique applied on the coefficient vector c and the associated positive semidefinite matrices simultaneously.
Modified Newton Iteration
Suppose that applying the PENBMI solver or Algorithm 1 in Section 4 yields numerical solutions that satisfy (1) approximately. Similar to Kaltofen et al. [2008] , we now present the modified Newton refinement method to refine these solutions. As has been discussed, Problem (1) can be transformed into an equivalent SOS programming (2), and further into a BMI problem of block form via Gram matrix representation. Observing (2), we find that the first condition in (2) is an LMI constraint, where as the second and third ones in (2) are BMI constraints. To take this into account, we consider the following problem
involving both LMI and BMI constraints, where the coefficients of the polynomials ϕ i (x, c), 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 are affine in c.
By solving the BMI problem (5), we can obtain the numerical vector c and the approximate positive semidefinite matrices W [i] , 1 ≤ i ≤ 3. We first convert W [3] to a nearby rational positive semidefinite matrix W [3] by nonnegative truncated PLDL T P Tdecomposition, in which all the diagonal entries of the corresponding diagonal matrix are preserved to be nonnegative. Hereafter, denote by φ(x) the rational polynomial
, and set θ = r 1 (x) 2 2 + r 2 (x) 2 2 , the backward error of the numerical solutions of (5), where
With the numerical c, W [1] , W [2] and the rational polynomial φ(x), we expand the two square matrix representations in (5) into their SOS forms, respectively:
where t and k are the ranks of W [1] and W [2] , respectively. Apply the Gauss-Newton iteration on two equations in (6) simultaneously to compute c, p i,α and q j,β such that
We update the vector c and matrices W [i] by c + c and
, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2, respectively, and terminate the Newton iteration when θ is less than the given tolerance τ . In doing so, we will obtain the refined solution, the vector c and matrices
and the backward error of the numerical solution satisfies θ < τ.
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Exact Recovery
In this section, we will present two error-free algorithms to obtain a rational vectorc, which satisfies the constraints in (5) exactly. Discussed in Section 5.1, we can obtain a refined solution c ∈ R k by applying the modified Gauss-Newton iteration. Instead of recovering the entries of c separately, we can deploy simultaneous recovery technique [Lagarias 1985 ] to achieve a rational vectorc near to c for a given bound D of the common denominator of c. Then we need verify whetherc is an exact solution of (5), that is, whetherc satisfies ϕ 1 (x,c) ≥ 0 and ϕ 3 (x,c) ≥ 0 |= ϕ 2 (x,c) ≥ 0, or equivalently, both ϕ 1 (x,c) < 0 and ϕ 3 (x,c) ≥ 0 ∧ ϕ 2 (x,c) < 0 has no real solutions. Clearly, verifying the solutionc is equivalent to determining two constant semialgebraic systems have no real solutions, which can be verified by Maple packages RegularChains, DISCOVERER [Xia 2007 ], SyNRAC [Yanami and Anai 2007] , and RAGLib [Din 2003] .
In this article, we focus on retrieving exact SOS representations for (5). We will discuss how to recover from c, W [1] , W [2] , the rational vectorc and rational positive semidefinite matrices W [1] and W [2] that satisfy exactly
Since the equations in (8) are affine in entries ofc and W 1 , W 2 , one can define an affine linear hyperplane
Note that the hyperplane (9) can be constructed from a linear system Ay = b, where y consists of the entries of c, W [1] , W [2] . If A has full row rank, such a hyperplane is guaranteed to exist. Then the rationalized SOS solutions of (5) can be computed by orthogonal projection if the matrix W in (7) has full rank, or by the rational vector recovery otherwise.
Case 1: W is of full rank Suppose the refined matrix W in (7) is of full rank numerically, namely, the minimal eigenvalue of W is greater than the given tolerance τ . In this case, for a given bound D of the common denominator, we apply orthogonal projection technique to obtain the rational vectorc and rational matrix W , which lie on the affine linear hyperplane defined by (9). This projection can be achieved by exactly solving the least squares problem:
For the rational solutionc and W of (10), we compute the exact PLDL T P T -decomposition to check whether W is positive semidefinite. If so, thenc is verified solution of (5). PROOF. Clearly,c and W satisfy the equations in (8). Let z andz be the vectors consisting of the entries in c, W and those inc, W , respectively. Because A has full row rank, we have Az − b 2 2 = θ < τ, and then Az = b. According to the perturbation result in Golub and Van Loan [1996, Th.5.7 .1] for full-rank underdetermined systems, we have
From (11) Remark 5.3. For a numerical solution of (5), 2ηκ 2 2 (A)τ 2 in Theorem 5.2 is a constant. Therefore, if A has full row rank and the given tolerance τ is small enough, then the orthogonal projection method by solving exactly least squares problem (10) will always find a rational positive semidefinite matrix W, therefore yielding a certified rational solutionc of (5).
Case 2: W is singular Kaltofen et al. [2012] point out that the orthogonal projection by solving (10) may fail if the resulted rational matrix W satisfying (8) is positive semidefinite but not strictly positive definite. In this case, we need to explore rational vector recovering technique to obtain the rationalc and W. Unlike in Lin et al. [2014] , the technique to be presented will recover the rational vectorc and matrix W simultaneously. More specifically, given a common denominator bound of the entries inc and W, we employ the simultaneous Diophantine approximation algorithm [Lagarias 1985] 0 by PLDL T P Tdecomposition. If so, the rational matrix W [2] can be obtained by orthogonal projection by solving the following exactly least squares problem:
Remark 5.4. Similar to (5), we first apply the modified Newton iteration to compute the refined numerical solutions c and W [i] of (2), respectively. For the given tolerance and common denominator, we employ rational vector recovery technique simultaneously for c and all the singular matrices among the W [i] , to find rationalc and the associated rational positive semidefinite matrices. Finally, orthogonal projection is applied on the remaining nonsingular matrices to obtain the rational nonsingular positive definite matrices. 
Algorithm
The results in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 yield an algorithm to find exact solutions to (5).
Algorithm 2. Verified Parametric Optimization Solver
Input:
a polynomial optimization problem of the form (5). D ∈ Z >0 : the bound of the common denominator. e ∈ Z ≥0 : the degree bound 2e of the SOSes used to construct the SOS programming. τ ∈ R >0 : the given tolerance. Output:
the verified solutionc of (5) with the W [i] , 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 positive semidefinite.
(1) [Compute the numerical solutions] Set up the SOS programming (5) with the degree bound 2e and apply PENBMI solver or Algorithm 1 to compute its numerical solutions. If the system has no feasible solutions, return "we can't find solutions of (5) with the given degree bound 2e." Otherwise, obtain c and W Remark 5.5. Our method cannot guarantee that polynomial invariants with rational coefficients will always be found due to the limitation on choosing the degree bound 2e and the common denominator bound D. Furthermore, it is difficult to determine in advance whether such invariants exist. Therefore, even if our algorithm does not yield any invariants, it does not necessarily follow that the given hybrid system has no polynomial invariants with the given degree bound.
Remark 5.6. The size of the BMI problem grows with the number of variables and the degree of the polynomials. This imposes a serious limitation on application of the proposed symbolic-numeric method in practice because many hybrid systems are of significantly higher dimension and degree. However, this problem can be partially overcome by using decomposition techniques suggested in Anderson and Papachristodoulou [2012] and Sloth et al. [2012] .
COMPUTATIONAL ISSUE
In practice, the unsafe region may be too big to find an appropriate invariant for verifying the safety of the given system. To deal with this issue, we can divide the original unsafe region into two parts, which can be achieved by bisection method through computing the minimum and maximum values of some variable x i . Then we compute the invariants that verify safety for two unsafe subregions X u,1 , X u,2 , respectively. This procedure can be easily repeated until the safety property have been verified for all of those unsafe subregions. The process for splitting the initial set can be handled similarly.
The following example is presented to illustrate the aforementioned technique.
Example 6.1 [Ratschan and She 2006, Example 2] . Consider the following nonlinear system
We want to verify that all trajectories of the system starting from the initial set will never enter the unsafe region X u , where = {(x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ R 2 : 2.5 ≤ x 1 ≤ 3∧x 2 = 0} and
For X u , the PENBMI solver or Algorithm 1 cannot yield a feasible solution of the associated SOS program. Therefore, it is impossible to obtain the invariant to verify the safety property for this system. Here, we split the original unsafe region into
. Then, our certified method, combining modified Gauss-Newton refinement with exact recovery technique, can yield the verified invariants with degree 2 for X u,1 and X u,2 , respectively. Thus, the safety of this system is guaranteed.
EXPERIMENTS
Let us present some examples of safety verification for hybrid systems.
Example 7.1 (Example 5.1 Revisited). Consider the safety verification problem of Example 5.1. We now apply Algorithm 2 to compute two invariantsφ 1 andφ 2 , that are subject to the strengthened LMI constraints in Lin et al. [2014] and the BMI constraints in (2), respectively.
According to Theorem 6 in Lin et al. [2014] , we construct an SOS system involving only LMI constraints. Applying the improved Gauss-Newton iteration and rational vector recovery techniques, we find an exact invariantφ 1 (x 1 , x 2 ) ≥ 0 until deg(φ 1 ) = 4, and the corresponding SOSes. Here we only list the invariant The invariantφ 1 (x 1 , x 2 ) ≥ 0 guarantees the safety of the given system. Alternatively, from Theorem 2.4, we construct another SOS system with BMI constraints and then apply Algorithm 2 to obtain an exact invariant with degree 2: This proves the safety of the given system. Consider again the system in Example 5.1 with the same initial set but a larger unsafe region X u = {(x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ R 2 : (x 1 + 1) 2 + (x 2 + 1) 2 ≤ 1}. Similarly, we construct the SOS systems with LMI constraint and BMI constraint, respectively, and apply Algorithm 2 to compute the invariants ϕ 1 (x 1 , x 2 ) ≥ 0 with deg( ϕ 1 ) = 6, and ϕ 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) ≥ 0 Table I shows the performance of Algorithm 2 for safety verification of some interesting benchmark examples. All the computations have been performed on Intel Core at 2.6GHz with 4GB of memory under Windows. Examples 1 through 4 correspond to Examples CLOCK, FOCUS, ECO, CIRCUIT in Ratschan and She [2007] , and Examples 5 through 8 correspond to Prajna and Jadbabaie [2004, Example 2] , Zaki et al. [2007b, Example 3] , Zaki et al. [2007a, Example 2] , and Ratschan and She [2010, Example 7] . In all the associated SOS programmings, the degree bound of SOSes is e = 6, and we set D = 1, 000 and τ = 10 −10 in Algorithm 2. Here, | | and n denote the number of locations and the number of system variables respectively; deg denotes the largest degree of equations in the systems; BMI Solver refers to the method used to obtain the numerical solutions of the given BMI problems; Num. Para. is the number of decision variables appearing in the BMI problem; deg( ϕ) and deg( ϕ LMI ) denote the degrees of invariants computed by Algorithm 2 and by the algorithm used in Lin et al. [2014] with LMI constraints, respectively; Fail means that the algorithm in Lin et al. [2014] fails to find invariants with degree ≤ 6; T B means the entire computation time in seconds using Algorithm 2, where T B1 is the part of computation for obtaining the numerical invariants, that is, Step (1) in Algorithm 2; T L represents the entire computation time using the algorithm presented in Lin et al. [2014] .
CONCLUSION
In this article, we present a symbolic-numeric method on safety verification of hybrid systems. A numerical invariant of a hybrid system can be obtained by solving a bilinear SOS programming via the PENBMI solver or iterative method. Then a method based on modified Newton iteration and rational vector recovery techniques is deployed to obtain exact polynomial invariants with rational number coefficients. Some experimental results are given to show the efficiency of our method.
